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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Man's flight to the moon will undoubtedly rank in
the annals of history as being one of the greatest techno
logical achievements of this c e n t u r y .

Never before has

man taken such tremendous strides to break away from the
earth's gravitational forces to explore space as he has
done over the last decade.

Certainly, future generations

all over the world will look back upon this event and
realize the impact it has had upon furthering United States
preeminence in space.

Nevertheless, despite the overall

impact that the space program and the lunar landing have
had on United States prestige among world powers, interest
in space exploration has been rapidly declining.

As a

result, the civilian space program under the direction of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
has been suffering from a massive slowdown since 19^ 7 .
As far back as I9 6 8 , space employment nationwide
declined to 220,000 in I968 from a peak of 420,000 the year
before.

This trend has continued up to the present, with

workers being terminated daily in space centers all across
the country.

Even scientists and engineers, who have had

years of training and experience in space technology, are
now flocking to other Jobs.

NASA's budget has been cut
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deeply from a high of 5*9 billion in 1966 to a present
low of 3.7 billion, and most of that has been earmarked to
clean up the Apollo Moon Project.

In response to this

devastating budget decrease in N A S A ’s operations, important
segments of the four billion dollar capital Investment in
plants and test centers by NASA are operating below capacity
and are possibly threatened with clo s u r e .

A t present no

large civilian projects, with the exception of "Skylab,**
a permanent orbital laboratory, are planned now that A m eri
cans have reached the moon.

Consequently, NASA continues

to lose public support as well as crucial appropriations
from Congress.
Such a slowdown is highly unprecedented in N A S A ’s
history.

In fact, NASA experienced unusually rapid growth

up to 1966, when finally its unparalleled expansion began
to wane.

This rapid growth can easily be seen in Figure 1,

which reviews N A S A ’s increasing space budget from 1958 to
1966, and its decreasing budget thereafter.

Projects such

as the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs were funded with
little resistance from Congressmen.

Space exploration and

technology became the focal point of the American public
as well as the aerospace industries, which became eager to
secure laige space contracts.

Companies such as North

American Aviation (now North American Rockwell), Boeing,
Martin-Marrietta, McDonnell, and others which had normally
dealt with defense contracts, could scarcely overlook

NASA
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4
the pleasant public image offered by "peaceful” contracts
that were associated with a trip to the moon, not to mention
the enormous profits Involved in the transactions •

Thus

did NASA experience overwhelming support from the President
and Congress, the American public, and the space i ndustry.
With such strong external support, the civilian space agency
faced little opposition from competing bureaus, e.g., the
Defense Department, during the first part of the last decade.
Such rapid growth for a young agency is very
unusual because most bureaus experience only gradual
development until they are older and able to establish
themselves.

A young bureau's external sources of support

are usually weak, or not accustomed to relations with the
agency-

Thus, the bureau must be able to demonstrate that

its services are worthwhile to some group with influence
over sufficient resources to keep it alive.

Once the

suppliers and beneficiaries of a bureau's services become
convinced of their gains from it, and develop routinized
relationships with it, the bureau can rely upon them for
the support it needs.

Eventually, the bureau's suppliers

and beneficiaries become automatic support generators.
NASA, on the other hand, was unusual because it
achieved this outside support from its suppliers and b en e 
ficiaries, i.e., the President and Congress, the American
public, and the space industry, from the outset.

These

external forces in NASA's environment were convinced of the
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gains from the space program and thus were able to develop
routinized relationships with the space agency very rapidly.
This situation automatically posed to the author several
very important questions.

Why were these external forces so

convinced of the gains from the space program and, more
importantly, why was NASA able to achieve such unusual accel
erated growth during the first part of the last decade?

Fin

ally, why did NASA, after having experienced a period of
rapid expansion, begin to decline or decelerate in growth
in 1966?
It is the purpose of this thesis to provide some
provisional answers to these questions in order to understand
why NASA's development has deviated from most other patterns
of bureaucratic growth.

In this regard, the author has

chosen to examine theoretical works on the concept of
bureau development, and analytically compare NASA's growth
patterns to these studies.
Anthony Downs, one of the leading authors in this
field, has provided some interesting insights into the
growth patterns of most bureaus.

In his book. Inside

Bureaucracy, Downs attributes an organization's g r o w t h,
stability, and decline to a series of external developments,
internal clianges, or both, which occur during a bureau's
struggle for autonomy.^

He describes autonomy as the

^Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Bostoni
Brown & Co., 1967) .
— "

Littla
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situation In which an agency has undisputed jurisdiction
over a function, service, goal. Issue, or c a u s e #

Autonomy,

he feels, is crucial In achieving a b u r e a u ’s "survival
threshold," I.e., It Is large enough to render useful
services, and old enough to have established routinized
relationships with Its major clients.
Downs discusses a bureau’s growth as generally being
a constant struggle for survival since there Is always the
possibility that the bureau will be annihilated or absorbed
by a much larger bureau.

Stability Is achieved when the

bureau becomes older and has been able to establish rela
tionships with Its beneficiaries and suppliers.

With this

support a bureau can generally defend Itself against com
peting elements in Its environment.

Decline may become

prominent If social functions of the bureau do not remain
Important, or If those social functions are taken over by
another bureau.

Thus, Downs states that major changes in

growth and decline of a bureau are often caused b y exo
genous, or external, forces In the b u r e a u ’s environment.
Certain environmental forces, he believes, affect a
bureau’s development more strongly than any purely internal
changes, although the relationship between external and
Internal developments tends to have cumulative effects on
growth or decline.
NA S A ’s growth and decline, however, provide some
Intriguing deviations from Downs* description of bureau

7
development.

Thus, the author will treat the study of

NASA's growth dynamics as a special case of Downs* theoryThe investigation will include a review of the relationships
between the following variables related to NASA's develop
ment*

international prestige; presidential ideology; and

other organizations, e . g . , the Defense Department (DOD)
and the aerospace industry.

In relation to this last

variable the study will discuss the potential "predatorprotector" relationship between DOD and the space i n dustryA discussion of these variables and their connection to
NASA should provide some interesting insights into the
reasons behind the space agency's unusual development since
its creation in 1958.
The method of this study is to review the literature
on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
in regard to major changes which have occurred within the
space agency from its creation to the present, with an
emphasis on discovering their c a u s e s .

My hypothesis, drawn

from a theoretical formulation by Downs, is that changes in
policy, function and internal structure are a consequence of
environmental forces.

This study, however, cannot "test**

hypotheses in the conventional sense.

What I propose to

do is provide a documented case for the proposition that
NASA's rapid growth and subsequent decline during the last
decade was a function of large scale changes in external
factors.

In short, I will be using a simple stimulus-response
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model of organizational changei

I will be focusing on the

relationship between changes in factors external and internal
to NASA.
External factors are those variables which lie
outside NASA and may or may not be contingent upon it.
Changes in and among external factors, operating through
certain organizational constants, produce concomitant
variation in policy, function, and organizational structure.
External variables include the behavior of other nations in
the space field, notably the Soviet Union; the Congress and
President; the American public ; the space Industry; and
competing bureaucracies, such as the Department of Defense.
Internal variables are those which Include major
changes in function, policy, or structure o f NASA.

Examples

of internal change are*

forma

changes in administration;

tion of new goals ; and changes in m e t h o d s , such as manned
space flight as opposed to automated methods of exploration.
The latter problem of procedures has been of particular
interest because of the rift in NASA between the scientists,
who favor fully automated flights, and the engineers, who
favor manned space flight.
Internal changes will be measured in the number and
kind of personnel shifts occurring in NASA since its crea
tion.

Number and kind o f changes in major policies m a y also

be used as an operational indicator to describe the impact
of external forces.

Appropriations of NASA from year to
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year should likewise give a good indication of the amount
of support NASA has received from Congress, and thus will
provide a clue as to when possible changes may have occurred
in the space a g e n c y The author will try to account for major changes in
external and internal variables by means of several theoreti
cal propositions.

The format of this thesis will consist

of a chapter by chapter account of the variables pertaining
to these theoretical propositions.

The first four proposi

tions will be discussed in Chapter 2 and related to the
variables of international prestige and presidential ideologyThe first proposition states that the more the programs of a
bureau contribute to national prestige, the higher its status
vis-a-vis other bureaus.

In reference to this theoretical

proposition, this study hopes to demonstrate that because
NASA's policies were centered around obtaining national
interests and international prestige, NASA was able to gain
a higher status, or more recognition from the executive branch
and Congress vis-a-vis other bureaus.
The first proposition is related to the second and
third which state, respectively, that the higher the status
of a bureau , the less it must compete for funds with other
bureaus, and the less a bureau must compete for funds, the
faster it grows.

Thus, the study will attempt to demonstrate

that because NASA more or less gained a favorable position
with governmental officials during its early years of growth.
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It did not have to compete greatly with allocational rivals
for funds.

As a result, it was able to achieve Its rapid

growth between 1958 and 1 9 6 6 .
The three foregoing propositions are linked with a
fourth which states that perceptions of presidential roles
may alter the speed with which a bureau grows, e.g., the
more conservative the president, the greater the restraint
on growth.

In relation to this proposition the author hopes

to demonstrate through documented events and policies that
the philosophy of the president In office, e.g.. Democratic
or Republican, has had a definite Impact upon N A S A ’s overall
growth pattern.

Thus are each of these four theoretical

propositions related to the Important external variables of
International prestige and presidential Ideology.
In Chapter 3 I will Investigate the role of compet
ing bureaucracles--namely, the Defense D e p a r t m e n t , upon N A S A ’s
growth.

The first of two propositions to be discussed states

that during periods of growth, agencies reject expansion of
functions, and during periods of decline, agencies resort
to Imperialism or logrolling In order to survive.

The second

asserts that In periods of decline, the more an agency log
rolls, the better Its capacity to defend Its core Interests
against the bureaucratic Imperialism of former r i v a l s .

Co n 

cerning these propositions, I hope to demonstrate that NASA
maintained Its functions and policies as a whole during Its
period of early rapid expansion %)ut when Its growth began to
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ebb» the space agency began to shift goals in order to sur
vive.

Thus, this study will attempt to show that because

NASA was forced to make major shifts in policy it was able
to withstand impending pressures of its rivals.
The author will also try to show that because NASA had
a large numberof competitors, e.g., the Army, Navy, and Air
Force, during its early years of growth, its ability to sur
vive was enhanced.

This was due to the fact that the Army,

Navy, and Air Force could not coalesce into a unified threat
to NASA—

"the divide and conquer concept."

This situation

is in relation to the proposition that, the greater the n um
ber of competitors that seek to absorb the central goals of
another agency, the lower the probability that the agency
will be destroyed.
Chapter 4 will be devoted to an analysis of the
aerospace industry as an important variable in the growth
dynamics of NASA.

In this chapter the author will discuss,

by means of formulating several propositions, the relation
ship between the aerospace industry and the Defense Depart
ment as well as NASA.

The first proposition asserts that the

greater the number of competitors seeking to absorb an agen
cy's goals, the lower the probability that the suppliers and
beneficiaries of that agency will support it.

The second

states that the stronger a bureau's competitors, the less
likely the bureau's suppliers and beneficiaries will support
that b u reau .

Concerning the applicability of these proposi-
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tlons to N A S A ’s growth, I will attempt to show that the Army,
Navy, and the Air Force, as well as,NASA, were competing
for the aerospace industry’s services, but due to the rela
tive size and number of these bureaus making up the Defense
Department complex, the aerospace industries often catered
to their requests rather than to the civilianspace agency—
NASA.

This situation has led to interesting developments

between NASA and the Defense Department which will be dis
cussed in this study, e.g., the relationship between NASA
and DOD has been steadily increasing since the early sixties.
In the last chapter I will summarize the theory
behind the space agency’s development in order to restate
some of the causes behind N A S A ’s unusual growth pattern.

I

will also reiterate the theoretical propositions set forth
at the beginning of each chapter and discuss my findings.
In doing so, I hope to make some possible predictions about
NASA’s growth in the future.

In other words, I will be m a k 

ing some projections on what I think will happen to NASA
in future years on the basis of the material gathered for
the completion of this study.

This study is primarily concerned with the internal
growth dynamics of one particular U.S. agency— NASA.

This

is not to say that the results of this study may not be
utilized in analytical comparisons of similar agencies or
bureaus in our governmental system.

Without doubt, then.
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studies of the growth patterns of bureaus such as this will
greatly enhance the knowledge and understanding of public
administrators, not to mention political scientists•
The scope of this study primarily entails a span
of thirteen years, which includes NASA's initial conception
in 1958 to the present.

However, it has proven to be

expedient in some sections of this study to include events
occurring just prior to 1958 »

The launching of Sputnik I

in 1957 is probably a good example.

It is this single

event above all others that probably heralded the need for
the creation of NASA as a civilian space agency.
Material for this paper was gathered from a variety
of sources.

These include Congressional hearings and reports*

newspapers, periodicals, trade Journal articles* statements
of those involved in space policy making* publications of
NASA's Historical Program* other books about the space
program* and books by or about individuals involved in space
policy matters.

Of all sources, the government documents

related to NASA were of the greatest value because of their
informative and voluminous nature.
It may also be mentioned that although the capsule
fire of Apollo 204, which killed Chaffee, Grissom, and
White, was probably the greatest tragedy of the space
program, it nevertheless unfolded a plethora of critical
analyses on NASA which have been crucial to this study.

Chapter 2
INTERNATIONAL IMPACT UPON NASA'S
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
In viewing any large scale changes in either the
growth or decline of NASA we must first look to the Inter
national setting and the possible Impact that some events
have had upon United States space policy and NASA's growth.
The basic premise here Is that the space program since Its
conception has been largely tied to the national prestige
and the national Interest of the United States and that
major policy decisions concerning space are made In regard
to these two factors.

The I s s u e , as Kennedy saw It, was

that the national Interest required a large, prestigeoriented space program.

It Is no coincidence that the goal

of landing a man on the moon was announced less than a
month after the abortive Bay of Pigs Invasion, which cost
the U. S. a good deal of International support.
Paul Seabury conceives the national Interest as
"a kaleidoscopic process by which forces latent In American
society seek to express certain political and economic
aspirations In world politics through the highest organs
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of the state."^

National prestige, on the other hand, is

defined by Vernon Van Dyke asi
• • • consisting of a reputation internationally
on four qualities*
(1 ) the pursuit of goals that
are creditable and that respond to the challenge of
the time* (2 ) the capacity to achieve the goals*
(3 ) the necessary determination to achieve them,
provided it can be done responsibly, i.e., by means
that do not involve the undue sacrifice of other
desirable goals * and (4) an assured future, in which
the other qualities making for prestige will be
preserved if not enhanced. Deference, as distinguished
from prestige, can be obtained on the basis of the
second and third qualities alone, and the proviso
attached to the third can be dropped.^
"Concerning space policy and national prestige,
Kennedy’s decision to develop the manned lunar landing and
return as a national goal was a direct result of his more
basic decision to reverse the policy that had guided the
space program during the Eisenhower y e a r s . T h e

lunar

landing decision for Kennedy was made in international
political terms, and not with respect to national research
and development policy as was found in Eisenhower’s later
years.

To Kennedy, the space program was an instrument of

^Paul Seabury, Power, Freedom, and Democracy*
The
Foreign Policy of the United States (New York:
Random
H o u s e , I963), p. 8 7 .
^Vernon Van Dyke, Pride and Power*
The Rationale
of the Space Program (Urbana, 1 1 1 . * University of Illinois
Press, 190^), pp. 119-1 2 0 .
^John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Noon*
Project Apollo and the National Interest {Cambridge*
mTT.T
Press, 19/'0}, p. 1 3 7 .
-----------------
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American foreign policy, a new means to elevate America's
global power position.

Kennedy made space policy decisions

In light of the conditions of International politics.
Because of the salience of International politics and
events with respect to the space program and the development
of NASA, we should perhaps begin with a review of several
key historical events and attempt to relate them to NASA's
growth or decline.

NASA's Initial conception has been

attributed by most authors In the field as a direct response
to the Russians' first successful launching of Sputnik I
on October 4, 1957.

Sputnik I had a tremendous Impact as

a historical "first" In space.

The feat Itself cannot be

questioned, but the public and official hysteria that fol
lowed In the United States was unusual under the circum
stances.

That Is to say. It was unusual only because the

U. S. had been discussing opening,

for the most p a r t , Its

own plans for a space shot for at least two years prior to
the launching of the Russian satellite.

In fact. Project

Vanguard was slated to be launched prior to Sputnik but
was held up by delays

Possibly a culmination of many of

^ h e Russians delivered an official report to the
headquarters for the International Geophysical Year (IGY) on
June 1 0 , 1 9 5 7 , declaring the readiness of their satellite
program.
This was four months before Sputnik I was launched.
They even announced the frequency on which its signals were
to be transmitted.
M e a nwhile, Interagency, I.e., Army, Navy
and Air Force, rivalry and repeated failures to get Vanguard
off the launch pad worked to slow the U. S. space program.
Finally, the success of Explorer I was presented as evidence
that the U. S. was not lagging too far behind the Soviets.
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these factors, reaching a crescendo with the failure of
Vanguard on the launch pad, placed the U. S. in a very
dismal position for any exploration of space ahead of the
Russians•
While the American public grew more uneasy over the
Russian demonstration of talent, the Congress responded
with a thorough investigation.

In fact, both the Senate

and the House had separate hearings, with a total of 108
witnesses, aimed at understanding the problems of space that
confronted the n a t i o n .

The Congress,

like the general pub

lic, became quite concerned as to just how far ahead in
space the Russians really w e r e .

In its investigations

Congress came to the conclusion that the U. S. was about two
years behind the Russians.

The "gap*' was not in scientific

talent or in the ability to utilize talent but one primarily
due to a lack of large booster development.
George V. Allen, director of the U. S. Information
Agency under Eisenhower, also faced a problem in dealing
with the question of the implications of space efforts
for national prestige.

He told the House Committee on

Science and Astronautics that the Sputniks had greatly
enhanced the prestige of the Soviet Union and that American
prestige had suffered.

He said, "All space activities

are now seen within the framework of the Soviet-American
competition.

Regardless of how Americans may feel about it.
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the world sees the U. S. In a space race w i t h the U.S.S.R.**

5

In reference to the hearing with Van Allen, a report was
made stating that the emergence of scientific achievement
Is of great importance to world prestige and international
influence.

Thus, Congressional investigations at this time

were very extensive and thorough in order to determine the
Ü. S.'s position in space in relation to the Soviet Union.
Actually, there was little cause for alarm at that stage
of the space race because the United States was not a great
deal behind the Soviets, although, as previously mentioned,
they lacked large booster power-

Nevertheless, the exag

gerated responses of the Congress, the press, and the lay
public produced inevitable results, some of which were clear
ly beneficial to the formation of a civilian space agency.
Efforts were made immediately to get the separate space
activities of various agencies all under one roof, with
one budget and one broad mission— it was to be labeled
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Eventually, the national interests In space were
outlined as to their importance, urgency, and inevitably
in the history-making report of the President's Science
Advisory Committee (PSAC).

Four factors were cited as

underlying America's space program:

man's curiosity; the

^ ' S. Congress, House, Select Committee on A s tro
nautics and Space Exploration, Astronautics and Space
E xploration, Hearings on H . R e s . T 1 8 8 l , 8 ^th Cong., Ènd Sess.,
I958I p ^ 5 1 2 •
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defense objective (i.e., "peaceful" defense against alien
space powers)I national prestige; and opportunities to add
to our scientific knowledge of earth, the solar system, and
the universe.^

The National Aeronautics and Space Act,

passed through the efforts of then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson
and his staff, became law on July 29» 1958.

By October 1,

three days short of the first anniversary of Sputnik I, NASA
had become firmly established.

Thus, a new space agency was

ushered in following the heavy clamor from Congressmen, the
press, and vocal citizens over Russia’s successful attempt
In placing the first unmanned satellite into o r b i t .

It is

undoubtedly true that N A S A ’s conception as well as its
continued growth in its early years was heavily dependent
on Russia’s activity in space.
The early years of the space age were marked by
numerous successes of a spectacular nature b y the Russians.
Sputnik I, of course, was spectacular because it was the
first satellite in space.

Sputniks II, III, and IV further

confirmed Soviet capabilities.7

These successful shots

were proclaimed by the Soviets as validation of Communist
preachments and prophecies about the superiority of their

^For discussion of PSAC and its functioning see Robert
Gilpin and Christopher Wright (eds.), Scientists and National
Policy Making (New York*
Columbia UnivêfsTtÿ"P r ess, 1964).
7
Vernon Van Dyke discusses other early Soviet shots—
Cosmic Rockets I, II and III, in Pride and Power, p. 20.
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polltlcal systeni»

Naturally» the U # S» was active durlng

this time and eventually proved Its technical capability In
space.

The U. S. launched thirty-three payloads before 196O

and Included were some of the notable firsts, e.g., the dis
covery of the Van Allen Radiation Belts.

Nevertheless,

the

failure of Vanguard I on December 6 , 1957 was a deeply morti
fying response to Sputniks I and II, and b y the end of I96O,
thirty-four additional attempts to launch satellites or es
cape payloads had failed.

A few vehicles were destroyed for

safety's sake ; some broke up In flight; the second or third
stage sometimes failed to Ignite or malfunctioned In another
way; and moon shots failed to reach the moon.
As the number of American launches suggest, the U. S.
space program achieved considerable magnitude under Elsen
hower.

Total budgets for space rose from 179 million to

the 1.2 billion that Elsenhower planned for fiscal year
1961— a sevenfold Increase.

Perhaps most I mportantly, a

program for the development of more powerful boosters under
the direction of V/erhner Von Braun at Huntsville, Alabama
was Initiated.

Therefore, NASA and the space program were

able to obtain substantial monetary support during the
Elsenhower years even though the President maintained a
conservative policy toward space.®

He held to this policy

®From Elsenhower's 1955 decisions dealing with
International Geophysical Year to his I96O disapproval of
NASA's plans for flights around the moon, "Eisenhower fol
lowed a rather conservative policy In space."
Ibid., p. 22.
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despite repeated challenges to it and to Its premises by
those in Congress and those in military and civilian life
who believedt as Eisenhower did not, that the political and
psychological impacts of space achievements were very im
portant factors in international politics, factors which,
as John Kennedy was later to claim, "may hold the key to
our future*"^

Eisenhower's space program then had a con

servative and careful aura about it which relinquished
national prestige for hard scientific data and accomplish
ments.

NASA's administration, especially its director,

Keith T. Glennan, reflected this attitude towards major goals
in space.

As a result, NASA advanced in space, but at a

very slow r a t e .
When considering the relationship between external
and internal factors, one would have to say in light of the
evidence presented, that external factors, e.g., Russian
activity in s p a c e , were the major impetus in forming NASA
as well as accounting for most of its growth ; while internal
factors, such as Eisenhower's perception of the dangers of a
new power in the military-industrial complex was a source
of restraint in growth.

We will see later in this study that

even the functions and structure of NASA has been altered by
these external and internal factors in its environment.

9
Ü. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences, Documents on International Aspects of
the Exploration and TJs~es of Outer Space, 195411962, BBth
Cong. 1st S e s s ., Senate, Document No. ÏÜ, 1963, p. 202.
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NASA was still heavily dependent on interagency co
operation, especially between the Army, Navy and Air Force.
It was also, and still is, greatly dependent on the execu
tive branch of the U. S. Government for policy formulation
and the legislative branch for appropriations.

"Therefore,

NASA has not achieved what Downs describes as its 'survival
threshold* and thus does not act as a functionally autono
mous a g e n c y N A S A ' s

growth has been dependent upon poli

ticians and engineers to control as they see fit according
to world events.
After 1 9 6 1 , and the beginning of the Kennedy era,
NASA took on a new look as a more active and viable agency.
Shunning the more conservative cloak of the Eisenhower
Administration and gaining a new emphasis on national pres
tige and national interest, NASA became more important on
the international level.

Soon after Kennedy took office,

he recognized that national prestige was an important factor
in world politics, and thus he soon linked it with spec
tacular space achievements.

He became convinced that space

achievements were linked closely to the power relationship
between East and West, and were symbolic manifestations of
national determination and vitality.

Once Kennedy did make

such a connection, however, he determined that Eisenhower's

^^Survival threshold implies a level of security
whereby a bureau is large enough to render useful services,
and old enough to have established and routinized relationships
with major clients.
Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy
(Boston*
Little, Brown, and Company, 196?), p. 9 .
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policy should he modified, and that "we should go to the
moon."

Overall, Soviet space successes had prompted a re-

evaluation of American education and technologyi they brought
to the surface many unsolved problems and unsatisfied demands
in most sections of American society-

"Two classified

surveys of overseas public opinion, prepared b y the U. S.
Information Agency and intended for the use of the executive
branch, were leaked to the press just ten days before the
November 8 elections; both showed that U. S- prestige rela
tive to that of the Soviet Union had declined, during the
Eisenhower presidency, and that U. S. allies in Europe be 
lieved that the Soviet Union's space successes presaged a
Communist trend to be predominant military a n d technological
power in the world.
The first study reported that "U. S. space successes
• • • have generated quite limited awareness in Great Britain,
and while productive of some improvement, still left the U. S.
far behind the Soviets in space leadership.

. . current

French opinion continues to put the U.S.S.R. overwhelmingly
ahead-

. . ."

12

The second report, dated October 10, I960

was "The World Reaction to the U. S. and Soviet Space Pro
grams— A Summary Assessment."

Polls were taken in Britain,

France, West Germany, Italy, and Norway and were based on

^^Logsdon, Decision to Go to the M o o n , p. 6 5 .

12

The New York T i m e s . October 2?, 196O, pp. 28-29.
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reactions to the nations* space programs.

The report con

cluded that "in anticipation of future Ü. S.-U.S.S.R. stand
ing foreign public opinion.

. . appears to have a declining

confidence in the U. S. as the 'wave of the future* in a
number of critical areas of competition."

l'î

Kennedy was noted for responding to this dilemma
by stating that "If the Soviet Union placed the first man
in outer space, it would be the most serious defeat that
the U. S. would suffer in many, many years.

...

Because

we failed to recognize the impact that being first in outer
space would have the impression that the Soviet Union was
on the march, that it had definite goals, that it knew how
to accomplish them, that it was moving and were standing
14
still."
Therefore, although Kennedy in the first few
months of his administration did not actively involve him
self in space policy, he was aware of its significance.^^
Action was soon taken to establish a central direc
tion of the civilian space agency.

13
14

Activation of the Space

Washington P o s t . October 29, i9 6 0 , p. A.L.

Van Dyke, Pride and P o w e r , p. 23*

^At the outset of Kennedy's Administration, "he
seemed to know less and to be less interested in issues of
space policy than almost any other set of policy questions.
See Hugh Sidney, John F. Kennedy, President (New York*
----------Athenium Press, 1964), pT 59.
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took place In March of I96I and Vice President Lyndon J ohn
son, who did much to establish NASA while Majority Leader
in the Senate, chaired the Council.

Functions of the chair

man and the Space Council were stipulated by Kennedy.

Ha v 

ing general supervision over NASA, Johnson would receive
all reports, plans, and policy documents that would ordin
arily have been sent to the president— although the presi
dent would approve important decisions.

Thus, NASA became

even more closely tied to the White House, which provided
it with a competitive advantage superior to most other
agencies buried in the administrative structure of the
executive branch.

Its stability as a viable governmental

agency was relatively insured because of the space program* s
impact on world opinion and because it was coordinated
through the White House.
Still, the Kennedy task force was highly critical
of NASA at this time, especially over NASA's proposed pro
gram for a manned space f l i g h t " T h e

President's Sci

ence Advisory Committee (PSAC) chaired b y Jerome Wiesner,
called Project Mercury 'marginal* and pointed out that
because of the U. S. lag in boosters, it was 'very unlikely'
that the United States would be the first to orbit a m a n ."

The Kennedy task force on space was called the Pres
ident's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC).
PSAC was origin
ally formulated under Eisenhower to review the space program
and to recommend changes in space policy.
17.

Logsdon, Decision to Go to the Moon, p. 7 3 .
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It was critical of the relative priorities given to manned
and unmanned flight.

One of the failures that the Wiesner

Committee feared was an attempt to place a n American In
space resulting In the death of an astronaut, or worse yet,
failure to recover him from orbit.

It Is also Important

to note that at this time, NASA's flight program was charact
erized by a very high percentage of unsuccessful launches,
primarily due to unreliable launch vehicles and boosters.
Even Kennedy himself and his staff focused their
attention on other matters at this time.

T h e y had to first

consider the nation's defense, decisions on new foreign
policy Initiatives, Issues on preparing legislation leading
to domestic social welfare programs, and on combating the
I96O-I961 recession.

At this time, Kennedy was also

deeply Involved with his first crisis, I.e., the decision
on whether or not the U. S. should Intervene In Laos.^®
Arthur Schleslnger, one of Kennedy's presidential advisors,
reported that In the first two months of his administration
Kennedy spent more time on the Vietnam and Laotian Inter
ventions than on any other matter.
Kennedy, then, at the outset of his administration,
had not made up his mind as to what his general attitude
toward a manned space flight would be.

18

One reason for his

The pro-American government of Phoumle N o savan
seemed near military defeat by the Communist Pathet Lao
forces, as well as the government of Ngo D l n h Diem In
South Vietnam.
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hesitation to approve the Apollo project was the uncer
tainty which plagued the success of Project Mercury-

Still,

Kennedy seemed to lean toward the approval of Apollo when
Influenced by members of the NASA administration, especially
Earl Webb, Its director, who was personally appointed by
Kennedy to that position.

Webb pointed out that If the

U. S. did nothing In space while the Soviet Union went on
from one triumph to another, American prestige would be
seriously jeopardized.

Webb said that#

A tendency exists In some quarters to belittle
the psychological value of Project Apollo. Think
. . . what the reaction would be In this country If
the Soviets made a successful landing on the moon
and we had no plans and no potential for getting
there. Certainly such a situation would be very
damaging to our position throughout the w o r l d . The
uproar after the first Sputnik would be mild Indeed
compared to the storm that would f o l l o w . 19
Kennedy listened Intently to this message.

Thus, this type

of argument greatly buttresses the proposition that external
factors such as possible Russian prestige In space greatly
aided NASA's overall growth*
Nevertheless, very few people In Washington In
early I96I expected a new look of the space program to come
as soon as It did.

But during the month of April a crisis

period arose which forced space planners and government

^9James E . Webb, "National Goals In the Space Age,"
NASA, Office of Scientific and Technical Information,
Proceedings of the Conference on Space Age Planning. Mav 6-9,
Ï963. Chicago, Illinois (Washington, I96 3 ) , p. 4.
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policy-makers to examine our national goals and space
programs.

Kennedy was informed by his intelligence sources

early in April that a Soviet flight attempt would soon be
made.

"On the evening of April 11th Kennedy was told by

Jerome Wiesner that the Soviet flight would probably occur
during the night
Wiesner was correct.

A dispatch from Moscow

announced*
The world’s first space ship Vostok with a man
on b o a r d , has been launched on April 12 in the Soviet
Union on a round-the-earth orbit.
The first space
navigator is Soviet citizen pilot Major Yuri
Alekseyevich Gagarin.
Krushchev, who was quick to take advantage of such
an opportunity, snapped, "Let the capitalist countries
catch up with our country!"

Adding further to the response.

East German leader Ulbricht added that the flight "demon
strates to the whole world that socialism must triumph
over the decaying system of yesterday."

Propaganda

emerging from the Soviet block stressed several themes*
(1) the Gagarin flight was evidence of the virtues of
"victorious socialism,"

(2 ) the flight was evidence of the

global superiority of the Soviet Union in all aspects of
science and technology.

^^Sidney, Kennedy, President, p. 111.
21

Lloyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and
Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean*
A History of Project
Mercury (Washington, d T “ c T*
NASA, 1966), p. 332.
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On an international level many countries were
unanimous in praise and exhaltation for the Russians* great
achievement.

Great Britain heralded universal praise for

the Soviets in their achievement.

France*s news media was

filled with accolades to the Soviet*s space spectacularAnd in Italy, the Vatican called the voyage "a universal
good."
In America, the event cost the nation heavily in
prestige and marred the political and psychological image
of the United States abroad.

It was then that Robinson

and Snyder considered our manned program for a lunar Isuiding
to have been made in crisis situation.

Snyder and

Robinson feel that certain criteria are needed for distin
guishing whether a situation is crisis-like or not.
These criteria are:
"(1) The extent of anticipation and prior programming.
(2) The ratio of time available for making a decision
to the demands of the t a s k .
(3) The scope and domain of the values at stake.
They characterize decisions that arise without
prior planning, allow short time for response, and have high
value consequences as most crisis-like decisions.

Using

James Robinson and Richard Snyder, "Decision
Making in International Politics," International Behavior:
A Social-psychological A n a l y s i s , edl Hubert Kelman (New
York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, I9 6 5 ) , pp. 440-442.
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these criteria, the decision to strengthen NASA and develop
a lunar landing program was very clearly crlsls-llke.

This

Is Important to note because, although the lunar landing
program had been discussed for several years. It still had
not received due attention until a state of high urgency
arose. I.e., Gagarin* s orbital f l i g h t .
The situation stood with the world believing that
the Soviet Union was the most scientifically and techno
logically competent nation In the world.

Jerome Wiesner

stated that "We are paying a price In all kinds of w a y s —
Internationally, politically"— and that was the Issue that
the president was dealing with.
The most vocal responses came from Congress.
Hearings, especially In the lower House, were conducted
In an atmosphere of panic, fear, and almost hysteria over
the Soviet's success In space.

Republican James Fulton,

speaking to Webb and Dryden during a session of the House
Committee on Science and Aeronautics, said, "I believe we
are In a race, and I have said many times, Mr- Webb,

'Tell

me how much money you need and this Committee will authorize
all you needî'"^3
Another statement by Representative King (Rep., N.Y.)
probably best reflects the Congressional mood toward a

3 u . S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and
Astronautics, Discussion of Soviet Man In Space Shot, 87th
Cong., 1st S e s s ., iy6i, p. 7 .
' "
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greater buildup of the space program and NASA.

He statesi

I would like to suggest that we are in a specific
race with the Russians. Who will get to the moon
first? In our race for the exploration of space
there are three major breakthroughs or dramatic
successes. . . The first satellite, the first man
in space, and the first man to the moon and b a c k .
The score is two to nothing, in favor of the
Russians. We still have the third prize to obtain.
I think the third is probably worth more than the
first two together.
So we are still in the race
Kennedy was well aware of both the public and
Congressional support for the space program.

He also knew

that this support would enhance his position as President
because he had already experienced heavy frustration in
obtaining passage of his previous programs.

He soon

accepted the space program as being his own.
The impact of the Soviet challenge In the Gagarin
flight greatly enhanced NASA's position as a governmental
agency.

It experienced rapid growth during this time with

its expanded budget.
Another international event, and thus external
factor, which aided NASA's growth at this time was the
failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

This failure on the

part of the Kennedy Administration left a large vacuum in
foreign policy and national prestige which was to be
filled temporarily by the United States'

success in space.

. S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and
Astronautics, 1962 NASA Authorization, Hearings on H. R.
3238 and H. R. 6 o 2 9 , b?th C o n g . , 1st Sess.. Part"2. 196^.
p. B2b .
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The fiasco of the Bay of Pigs reinforced Kennedy's
determination to approve a program aimed at placing the
United States ahead of the Soviet Union in the competition
for firsts in space.

It was one of the m a n y pressures that

converged on the president at the t i m e , and thus its exact
influence cannot be isolated.

As president, Kennedy could

treat few issues in isolation, and there seems to be little
doubt that the Bay of Pigs was in the foremost of his
thoughts as he called Lyndon Johnson to his office on
April 19 and asked him to find a space program which
promises dramatic results in which we could w i n S u c h
external pressures contributed greatly to HASA's prestige
among U. S. priorities.

Actual growth at this time was

evidenced by additional funding by Congress for both
Gemini and Apollo programs.

Larger boosters were being

developed and centers around the country were expanding.
On May 5» 19^1, Alan Shepard made his successful
suborbital flight which brought a wave of national relief
and pride over the U. S.

Later Kennedy announced his

intention to accelerate the space program and that he
planned to undertake a substantially larger effort in

^ ^ h e Bay of Pigs invasion consisted of a group of
Cuban exiles, trained and financed by the CIA, who attempted
to invade Cuba and overthrow the Castro regime.
The
invasion began on April 15, 1961 and on April 19 it was
declared a total failure.
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space.

It was later reported that Kennedy planned to

add $600 million to the civilian and military space
budget.
The NASA budget was Increased by $5^9 million for
the Fiscal Year 1962, which was coupled with a $126 million
March Increase.

This represented a 6 l percent Increase

In the NASA budget over the Elsenhower figure of $1.1
billion.

The Department of Defense was given $62 million

for work on solld-fuel boosters.
Kennedy* s recommendations for setting a lunar
landing as a national goal found Immediate and almost
unanimous support not only In Congress but also across
the nation.

In only eight months between September I96O

and May I96I the status of manned space flight had reached
a new high in United States priorities.

It seemed to have

an unlimited future.
With the support of Congress, the President, and
the nation as a whole, NASA soon began to move at an
accelerated pace.

NASA then, experienced rapid growth

as a bureau In both Its size and the relative social
significance of Its functions.

This occurred, as previously

cited. In response to external environmental conditions
favorable to the expansion of the bureau* s functions.

James Webb, NASA Press Release, May 25» I9 6 1 .
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I.e., development of scientific and technological knowledge
about space with a subtle emphasis on winning the race to
the moon ever the Soviet Union.
This accelerated expansion seen through the early
Sixties was perhaps highlighted by John Glenn's first
American orbital flight in February, 1962.

The flight

inspired feelings of tremendous pride and quiet jubilation.
It was a monumental achievement of which America was
certainly proud, and it revived a feeling of pride and
self-confidence.
Such a successful flight is said b y many authors
to have placed far too much confidence in America's
technical capacity in space.

With the national prestige

high, and the national morale restored, a concern for
prestige and pride lost some of its force as a motive for
a space program.
obstacles.

The growth acceleration soon ran into

Anthony Downs best describes NASA's rising

difficulties as "trying to produce impressive results as
its organization grew larger and more unwieldy."

Continuing,

he states that, "a bureau cannot generate external support
(except among its suppliers) without producing services
beneficial to someone outside its own members.

Therefore,

a bureau must periodically come up with impressive results
if it wishes to sustain its growth."^7

NASA's staging of

^^Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 12.
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dramatic events over well-spaced intervals best illustrates
this concept.

As it has grown larger and taken on more

functions, it has become increasingly difficult to produce
convincing results.

An example of a new function was the

development of a manned lunar program which had limited
scientific and military implications.

The commitment to a

lunar landing has constituted a policy of impressive results
that took too long to achieve.
Downs also states that "as the accelerating bureau
grows larger, it encounters more and more resistance to
further relative growth of its functions at the expense of
op
other activities of society."
Senator Pulbright best
described the changing mood by sayingi

"Are there not other

factors Involved in our prestige and self-esteem, such as
our capacity to employ and educate, to house and transport
our own people?"
The change began to show in Congress in the spring of
1962 following John Glenn's orbital flight.

Many Congress

men began favoring cooperation with Russia in space or at
least they lessened their desire in some form to beat the
Russians.

This resulted in doubt about the justifiability

of the entire program, particularly the projected manned
lunar landing.

For the most part, the shift in attitudes

^®Ibid.
29

J. William Pulbright, "The American Agenda," Satur----day Review (July 20, 19 6 3 ) , p. 1 5 .
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was due to Increasing awareness ofthe Influence of pride and
to a genuine belief that the desire to bolster it through
a lunar landing did not justify the great expenses involved.
Such a shift of attitudes has also led to internal
dissension in the organization itself.

This dissension

has developed mainly between the engineers and the scientists,
causing a structural and functional rift in NASA.
The problem exists because, traditionally, NASA has
put technology before science.

"This approach led to the

resignation of three of the elite handful of scientists—
astronauts, and the departure of several top scientists from
the Apollo program as well as angry mutterlngs from the aca
demic community that space officials were slighting science
The rift between scientists and engineers was perhaps strong
est during the Mercury flights in I96I and I962 and over the
years the struggle produced constant tension and shaky com
promises.

Recently, scientists have been urging NASA to

devote its energies to a sustained series of flights seeking
greater knowledge of the moon's origin and evolution.

But

most engineers are still eager to build bigger spacecraft
and better rockets and push on to other planets.

The sci

entists became greatly disappointed over the âiift in goals
of NASA during Kennedy's Administration.

Previously, the

Eisenhower Administration had stressed the peaceful purposes

30

Johnathan Spivak, "Rift in NASA:
Scientists Make
Gains in Clash with Engineers over U. S. Space Goals," Wall
Street Journal, November l4, 19 6 9 , p. l.
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In space to avoid the appearance of* militarism, and thus
stressed the scientific aspect of the program.
While Kennedy and Johnson were In office, however,
the space effort was aimed more at the glamorous and specta
cular aspect of a manned lunar flight, rather than the sci
entific nature of the program.

Commenting further on the

science/engineering rift. Dr. H. H. Hess, once chairman of
the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences,
asserted that "the lunar program does not have the enthusi
astic support of many scientists" and explained that It was
"primarily an engineering, technological, a n d biomedical pro
ject , not a basic scientific e f f o r t M a n y

scientists

were worried that a man-In-space program would cost more
than the scientific returns would Justify.

They felt that

the same returns and more could be gathered b y fully auto
mated unmanned space p r o b e s •
Some scientists* protests and private pressures
finally began to have an effect on NASA's priorities.

More

scientists have been and are now being trained as astro
nauts for future lunar flights.

In fact, moon shots have

been Interspersed as to allow the development of technical
Instruments which will take years to produce.

Therefore,

Internal developments between the scientists and the engin
eers have brought about a réévaluation of the goals of the

^^Van D y k e , Pride and Power, p. 95.
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space program as well as a change of pr o c e d u r e , such as
stress on automated flights and broader scientific coverage*
Also, more scientists over the years have b een phased Into
administrative positions and thus have realigned some of
NASA's operations.
The main Impetus which formulated this réévaluation
of the space program to Its original goals has been the
slackening of Russian activity In space (although within
the last year the Soviets have become more active In the
development of the orbiting space station, Salyute) •

It Is

this period of "external slack" which has allowed the Presi
dent , Congress, and the American people to reevaluate the
Importance of landing a man on the moon.

Because of the

prior outbacks and major slowdown of NASA, Its functions
again began to compete allocatlonally with other programs
for social attention and resources.
People then, may not become aware of a value until
a threat to It develops; and If the threat r e c e d e s , concern
for the value may recede.

This can be clearly seen In

reference to NASA's growth dynamics.

It took the external.

International factors of Sputnik and Gagarin's flight to
awaken the American people and Congress to some precious
values— especially to the Importance of pride; and with the
restoration of pride, c c n c e m for It diminished.
NASA then had an unprecedented rate of growth In
the early Sixties, which seemed to be In response to external
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factors or events In its environment.

The lack of those

same factors caused a leveling and finally a tapering effect
upon NASA in recent years, especially since 1 9 6 7 .

With the

lack of an external threat, internal factors became im
portant» i.e., scientist and engineer rifts, as well as a
questioning of the basic goals and functions in relation
to other competing elements in society.

Clearly, NASA is

in deep trouble as an agency of the government if its
social functions do not expand.

This situation will be de

pendent upon other external or exogenous factors in its
environment other than Russian activity in space.

These other

factors are primarily NASA's supporters and beneficiaries,
industry and the Department of Defense.

Because of the

importance of these two elements, we have devoted the next
two chapters to an analysis of their relationship w ith NASA
and how they have affected NASA's growth as a governmental
agency.

Chapter 3
NASA AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Having considered the ways in w h i c h international
factors have provided a major impetus for the overall de
velopment and growth of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, we should now turn to another important
external factor which has greatly affected N A S A ’s growth
dynamics, the Department of Defense (DOD).
Most bureaus or agencies have functional and allocational rivals in at least one area, and NASA is no excep
tion.

As one of the newer bureaus of the late Fif t i e s , NASA

was especially vulnerable because its initial external sources
of support were generally weak, or at least were not routinized into a relationship with the space agency.

Perhaps

the basic problem was a lack of organizational autonomy
because of its dependence not only upon the executive branch
for direction and the Congress for appropriation, but also
upon the DOD, because the Army controlled booster power,
the Air Force launched the missions, and the Navy directed
important research and rescue functions for the space pro
gram.

In its formative years, NASA lacked the relative

autonomy needed for control of in-house activities.

A uton

omy gives an organization a stable claim to resources and
places it in a favorable position to compete with other
40
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groups for those resources *

Lack of autonomy was a major

factor retarding NASA's growth prior to Sputnik because it
was under constant threat of being absorbed by its much
larger functional and allocational rival, the DOD.
The question of military versus a civilian space
agency dates back to the Eisenhower Administration.

In

April 1955» President Eisenhower approved plans for launch
ing an American satellite ; he designated that the earth
satellite program be separated f r o m , and not interfere
with, DOD work on long range ballistic missiles.

The separ

ation of the satellite mission from the development of
military hardware meant that the satellite program was to
be conducted for scientific purposes only.
This policy was somewhat altered upon the success
ful launching of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union in 1957.
Nevertheless, Eisenhower remained fairly firm in his inten
tion to make the space program a civilian and scientific
effort rather than a military campaign.

Eisenhower's

stand on the issue of placing the military in a secondary
role in space can best be seen in the following statement*
If the project is designed solely for scientific,
purposes, its size and its cost must be tailored to the
scientific job it is going to do. . . •— If the project
has some ultimate defense value, its urgency for this
purpose is to be judged in comparison w ith the probable
value of competing projects

U . S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Astronautleal
and Space Sci e n c e s , Documents on International Aspects of the
Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, 1 9 5 4-1962. BBth Cong..-1st S e s s . , 1963, S. Doc. lb, pp. 3d, ^1.
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One of Elsenhower's most important reactions to Sput
nik I was to grant American scientists increased access to
the highest echelons of national policy making.

In the

several weeks following the launch of the Soviet satellite,
more scientists met with the President than had done so in
the previous ten months.

The President's Science Advisory

Committee (PSAC) moved from a limited and low-level position
in the Office of Defense Mobilization to the White House.
PSAC was given the full responsibility for laying out in
more detail the goals of the national space program.
listed four important goals of the program as %

It

"(1 ) full-

fill the compelling urge of man to explore and to discover;
(2 ) the defense objective ; (3 ) the factor of national pres
tige ; (4) provide new opportunities for scientific observa2
tion and experiment.”
PSAC thus revealed the need to
establish a civilian-oriented space agency, rather than one
under military management.

The Committee felt that it would

not be in the best national interest to exploit space sci
ence at the cost of weakening U . S . efforts in other sci
entific endeavors «

Probably the most lasting effect of

the Eisenhower space policy was his insistance on separat
ing civilian and military space efforts and on giving the
primary emphasis to civilian efforts.

The decision to

establish NASA, the civilian space agency, was a direct

^Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright (eds.), Sci
entific and National Policy Making (New York:
Columbia
University Press, 1964).
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result of that policy.
Out of the Eisenhower Administration emerged a
coordinated space program.

Nevertheless, supporters of

the program could not agree on the specific features of
the program.

Rivalry between the Armed Services, espec

ially the Army and Air Force as well as NASA, aided in
fragmenting the program.

Even the National Space Council,

whose purpose was to help coordinate these elements and
set policy directions, had little support from the Presi
dent.

In fact, Eisenhower received support from the House

to abolish the Council.

This move, however, was later

aborted by Lyndon Johnson, then Senate Majority Leader,
who felt that the Council would be important in the future.
Rivalry among the Armed Forces and with NASA for control
over the space program was perhaps greatest in relation
to the manned space program.

Against this background of

disequilibrium in the space policy-making process, several
decisions emerged which greatly affected NASA's overall
growth*

first, the assignment of responsibility for manned

space flight programs to NASA in mid-1958 and second, the
transfer of the Saturn booster program from the Army
Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) to NASA.
NASA was now competing heavily with a much larger
and stronger functional rival, the Air Force.

The Air

Force had long planned a program for a manned space flight
with an initial objective of achieving satellite flight
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as soon as possible.

In fact, the Air Force had competed

heavily with NASA's predecessor, the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics ( N A C A ) B y

mid-1958, the

President assigned the responsibility for the nation's
first manned space program to NASA.
The Air Force, or at least its space-oriented
division, never completely reconciled itself to this
decision.

All through 1959» and 196 0 , the A i r Force

continued to campaign for a military flight program.
The Air Force campaign continued throughout the Sixties
and still provides a major threat to NASA today.
The second major decision was the transfer of the
Army Ballistic Missile Agency's (ABMA) Von Braun team to
NASA.

Dr. W e m h e r Von Braun and his associates were

developing large boosters required to launch much heavier
satellites.

Problems arose in developing the large

boosters (Saturn series) and the program was transferred
to the Air Force.

This decision was followed by months

of Army-Air Force conflict, and left the A i m y with a
space booster team but no mission for its use.

The Air

Force, of course, insisted that the Von Bratan team also
be transferred to them, but the ABMA opposed the Air
Force request.

Because of this opposition between Army

% h e Air Force, and especially the Ballistic Missile
Division of the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC),
had been interested in developing an Air Force manned
space flight capability since 1956.
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and Air Force, the Army finally supported a transfer of
the team to NASA.

NASA now had the manned space flight

mission, the spacecraft, and the booster experts to carry
out its mission.

Plans for a full-fledged moon program

were finally to be realized, and as a result, NASA grew
by enormous strides.

It was shortly after this time

that NASA began to achieve support from President Kennedy
as well as increased support from Congress.

This unpre

cedented support enabled the civilian space agency to
withstand the many pressures placed upon it b y its military
competitors.

Even the nati o n ’s communications media were

stressing the manned flight program of NASA.

This emphasis

seemed to strike a responsive note with the American
people, indicating at least a latent support for future
manned flights.
The rivalry between the Army and the Air Force
provided a divided opposition which favored NASA because
both the Army and the Air Force preferred to give con
cessions to NASA rather than to each other.

This type of

external stimulus greatly aided N A S A ’s growth and its
stability in later years.
These early concessions have helped draw the
defense system closer to NASA.

"Air Force planners now

agree that they can benefit from N A S A ’s work and they and
the civilian agency are establishing more joint committees
and lines of liaison to assure that each benefits from the
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other's progress»**^

As a result, a positive relationship

between NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD) has been
steadily increasing since the early Sixties.

"The trend

has accelerated partly due to the fact that both the
Congress and the Executive Branch have seemingly favored
spending money on anti-poverty programs or *hard* defense
goals

It has been important for NASA to maintain the

guise of a peaceful space agency in order to gain and
maintain public support for all space projects and yet give
the DOD space efforts an effective "cover."
This improved relationship between NASA and the DOD
has been an important underlying factor in NASA's stability
and growth dynamics.

Such a union has provided general

support from the powerful defense-oriented bloc within
Congress.

This Congressional bloc had normally defeated

major appropriations bills to NASA as a civilian agency.
It is for this reason that NASA administrators have taken
full advantage of major defense spin-offs that have acorued
from NASA's technical capabilities.

"NASA is careful.

E d i t o r s of Fortune, The Space Industry*
America's
Newest Giant (Englewood Cliffs, N. J . * Prentice Hall,

T96ZTT"-pr33.
f r i e n d A. Kennan and Edmund H. Harvey, Mission to
the Moon*
A Critical Examination of NASA and the Space
Program (New York*
William Morrow & Co., 1 9 6 ^ ) , 'p'. 2 l 6 .
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however, In not overdoing the defense tie-up because it
must not only maintain a cover up for some defense projects
but it must also protect itself from being too fully
absorbed into the defense department or be abolished all
together."^
In reviewing the NASA-DOD relationship it is evident
that it began during the late Fifties.

At this time NASA

relied heavily upon the Army for its booster power as
well as upon the Air Force for mission control.

Continuing

into the Sixties, the Defense Department gained a strong
hold in the field of space.

Appropriations for military

space activities were larger than appropriations for NASA
until the Apollo program was initiated.

The most obvious

and least controversial military applications of space
technology are now found generally in the areas of
communication, navigation, meteorology, and geodesy, where
a considerable amount of non-military applications overlap.
One of the earlier military efforts to balance the
Soviet space threat was a project called ^Samos.”

“Samos,"

as a reconnaissance satellite, was used to replace the
former U-2 planes.

Its cameras and other devices provided

intelligence concerning the precise location of Soviet
missile launching sites.

Another program, unofficially

^ I b i d . Kennan and Harvey report that approximately
75 percent of NASA's Space Vehicle Division effort, while
aimed at NASA objectives, is of direct benefit to DOD.
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called "Ferret," provided satellites that could Intercept
radio, radar, and microwave telephone transmissions In the
Soviet Union.

Still another military satellite was nick

named "Midas," which was originally equipped with Infra
red sensors to detect enemy missile launchings.

This

satellite, however, proved unsuccessful after the military
discovered that the satellite's Infra-red devices could
readily be tripped by heat from large Industrial furnaces
In the Soviet Union.
These military adventures are listed here only to
demonstrate how DOD activity In space overlapped with
that of NASA.

An example of a logrolling strategy was the

close relationship between the Apollo Applications Program
(AAP) of NASA and the Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL) of
the Air Force.

The Apollo Applications Program (AAP)

was a series of shots designed to make use of leftover
Apollo hardware after the moon landing had b een accomplished.
Its purpose was to conduct long-duratlon space flights and
to perform scientific Investigations In earth o r b i t .

The

Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL) of the military was very
similar except that maneuvers would be of a defense nature
and highly secretive.

Many governmental officials felt

that both programs led to duplication.

NASA defended AAP

and MOL by stating that the programs were not directly
related and that NASA was cooperating with the MOL p r o j e c t .
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The Bepubllcan Platform and Richard Nixon in I968
deplored the lack of emphasis on the military use of space
for America’s defense.

Now N i x o n ’s Administration has

tended to favor financial cuts in the civilian space
program.

Consequently, the military has succeeded in

gaining stature with Washington at N A S A ’s expense.

This

can be clearly seen in the major slowdown that both
NASA and the aerospace industry have been experiencing
over the last five years.

With N A S A ’s famous shot to

the moon completed and its slowdown continuing, it has
sought closer ties with its larger competitor— the Depart
ment of Defense (DOD).
Richard Lyons of the New York T i m e s , in an October,
1968 issue, wrote that*
NASA, which was once reluctant about associating
itself with the military uses of space, n o w appears
more relaxed.
In order to sell the space agency to
Congress and the taxpayers, NASA officials now adopt
the line that military objectives are among the
beneficial •’spinoffs” from the 43-billion ^ p e n t
through 19687 national space program.
Much of N A S A ’s defense work is based upon a clause
in the 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act (amended
in 1962), which directs NASA to make discoveries available
to agencies directly concerned with national defense.
The Act also enables the military to provide NASA with
information which is of value to that agency.
Some of the areas in which NASA has been working
closely with DOD are cited in the following paragraphs.
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"DOD technology requirements and research activities
are tcJcen into account in the formulation of practically all
of N A S A ’s research and technology p r o g r a m s S e v e n t y five percent of N A S A ’s Space Vehicle Division effort,
while aimed at NASA objectives, is of direct benefit to
DOD,

NAwA boasts of its 5t6ll man-hours in testing a

Titan rocket model, 2,900 man-hours conducting wind
tunnel tests on Titan 3» and 13,000 more man-hours testing
a one-fifth size scale model of the Titan 3, all for the
Air F o rce .
NASA is also gaining a larger share of research
concerned with the Vietnam War.

"The Space Agencies Office

of Advanced Research and Technology has spent between 4
million and 5 million dollars a year directing the efforts
of 100 scientists and engineers on tasks vital to the
Vietnam War."®

One of N A S A ’s "limited warfare" teams has

been developing a super-quiet aircraft engine that will
enable aircraft to drop their payloads before the enemy
is aware of their presence.
The House Subcommittee on NASA Oversight stated
that NASA could loft a syncronous satellite over southeast

^Ibid., p. 2 0 7 .
®Ibid., p. 208.
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Asia.

The satellite would be equipped w ith a huge

mirror designed to reflect the sun's rays for twenty-four
hours daily, thus providing light for the darkened Jungles.
Finally, the project was abandoned due to protests from
civilian astronomers and naturalists.
NASA has always worked closely w i t h DOD, but has
acknowledged its close relationship only recently.

One

aspect of the relationship between NASA and DOD is the
"old soldiers and sailors" clause in the NASA Act of 1958*
This clause authorizes (but does not require) the adminis
tration to employ retired commissioned officers of the
Armed Forces of the United States.

This clause has

resulted in NASA's becoming heavily manned w i t h admirals
and generals, as well as with engineers of which the Armed
Forces has a large supply.

For example, "at the end of

1967, there were 323 military personnel 'on detail' to
NASA.

These included I89 from the A i r Force, 99 from the

A r m y , 32 from the Navy and three from the Marine C o r p s ." ^
Engineers compose the largest segment of the NASA operations
and many of these engineers are retired commissioned officers
from the service.

Engineers, especially at the administrative

level, have been responsible for the technology development
of NASA's Apollo moon pro j e c t .

9ibid., p. 2 1 5 .

This has caused a personnel
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imbalance which has resulted in a "lump" effect in the
organization"s manpower structure.

Such a n abundance

of retired military personnel and engineers in administrative
positions has aroused an outcry from the deprived scientists
in the program.

The scientists have felt the pressure in

the engineer-oriented moon program.

This has led to

internal dissension and goal realignment in future programs.
The likelihood that the scientists will become as impor
tant as the military or the engineers in future NASA
space programs is doubtful.
It is concluded that not only is NASA's program
more or less defense-oriented, but there has always
existed, concealed from public scrutiny, a vigorous Defense
Department space program.

NASA is not the only agency

whose functions relate to the space effort, and thus
NASA has been experiencing more and more pressure from
its stronger and larger competitor— the DOD.
NASA has realized its dilemma and has tried to
shift many of its peaceful functions in space explorations
to more defense-oriented programs in order to gain
Congressional and Executive support.

Anthony Downs in

his book Inside Bureaucracy refers to this procedure.
He states that "bureaus are often willing to shift
functions in order to survive; hence the relative decline
of their initial social functions will not kill them if
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they are agile enough to undertake new and more viable
functions before it is too l a t e S t a r b u c k

elaborates

on this by stating that "as a bureau ages, its officials
become more willing to modify the bureau's original formal
goals in order to further the survival and growth of Its
administrative machinery."
NASA, however, in its attempt to remain a viable
agency, may have gone too far by adopting defense measures
in its programs.

Originally NASA was to be a civilian

agency working in the scientific aspect of peace.

Now the

bureau's original goals are being modified to include
national security and national prestige.

The danger in

modifying such goals is that NASA's functions may be a
duplication of the DOD's work in space.

Under such a

situation, NASA is in danger of being absorbed by its much
larger functional rival.

The tragedy is that the "civilian"

space agency is slowly being whittled away, while the
space portion of the DOD is obtaining funds taken from
NASA.

Figure 2 illustrates how DOD's space spending has

risen every year since 1966, while NASA's budget has

^^Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston*
Brown & C o ., 196?), p. 2^1
"

Little.

^^William H. Starbuck, "Organization Growth and
Development," Handbook of Organizations, ed. J. G. March
(ChicagoI
Rand McNalley, 196^4-) .
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steadily fallen.
Summarily, NASA, during its earlier years of growth,
received overwhelming support as a civilian agency accom
plishing scientific results with a secondary emphasis on
defense in space.

Now, the space agency is being pressured

by the Department of Defense and hawkish governmental
elements to re-evaluate its original goals and to modify
many of its former functions.

A lack of any large measure

of space activity until just recently, plus the increased
pressure from the Department of Defense (another external
element), has produced some large scale changes in NASA's
growth.

Acting as a catalyst, the recessive nature of the

national economy over the past few years has aided the
tapering and slowing down of NASA* s development as a civi
lian agency.
John Noble Wilford best described NASA's situation
in an article in a mid-April, I968 issue of the New York
Times when he said, "After a heady decade o f uninterrupted
hiring, building and dreaming great dreams of far-reaching
exploration, the American /civilian7 space program is
gearing down to a slower pace and a less certain future."
Perhaps NASA's only means of survival, or at least autonomy,
lies with its suppliers or beneficiaries.

Downs states

that "If a bureau's suppliers (industry) or beneficiaries

1968

.

^^John Noble Wilford, The New York T i m e s , April I6 ,
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are strong and well organized in comparison to its rivals,
then it will probably quickly gain a clearly autonomous
position."^3

With this in mind, this study will review in

the next chapter the space industry's role In the formulation
and continuation of NASA's growth.
The outlook for NASA is questionable for the
remainder of the Seventies.

Space industry and other NASA

supporters are becoming fewer and thus will not be able
to bring the space agency back to its former status.

NASA's

competitor (DOD) is encroaching more and more upon the
civilian space agency.

Even the press, aerospace industry,

and the Pentagon have provided a clear indication that
defense spending in space will probably soar in the Seven
ties.

The loser will be NASA, as well as its supporters

who have dreamed about future peaceful explorations of
space.

-'Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 10.

Chapter 4
THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRYi

A KEY

TO NASA'S DEVELOPMENT
Having previously discussed the role of increased
military activity in space, as well as the impact of
international events upon NASA's overall growth, a word
should be said about a third external factor greatly
affecting NASA's development— the aerospace industry.

The

aerospace industry is particularly important because, as
both a supplier and a beneficiary, this industry holds
the key to NASA's future growth and development, as well
as to its autonomy as a functioning bureau*
In viewing the aerospace industry in an overall
perspective, it is one of the largest and most powerful
segments of the industrial w o r l d .

Its position in

America's future is best cited by Karl C. Harr, J r . ,
president of the Aerospace Industries Association.

Accord

ing to Kennan and Harvey, Harr said:
This industry almost alone is the possessor of
of the advanced technology on which the future well
being of the nation depends.
This is true not
only in terms of military security, but also applies
to the myriad of other accomplishments that will
determine the prestige, power, and economic status
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of the United States in the world of tomorrow.^
Its vastness can best be seen by reviewing lists of numerons
aerospace corporations, large and small-

These various

companies, such as North American Rockwell (North American
Aviation prior to I9 6 7) . McDonnell, Boeing, MartinMarietta, etc., and their subdivisions, propose, design,
and develop launch systems, space craft, satellites and
other technical equipment that NASA utilizes in conducting
its exploration of s p a c e .
The aerospace industry* s political power can be
shown by its ability to tie one state, such as California,
closer to federal control.

Dr. James L. Clayton, Assistant

Professor of History at the University of Utah, maintained
t h a t , "wages and salaries paid to aerospace employees in
California, since World Warr II, had exceeded all state and
local public welfare expenditures throughout the entire
nation."2

For the period between 1951 and I 9 6 5 , "$6?.2

billion, or about 20 percent of all DOD prime defense
contracts for suppliers, services, and construction, were
received in that one state.

A n additional 5.3 billion was

^Erland A. Kennan and Edmund H. Harvey, Mission to
the Moon*
A Critical Examination of NASA and the Space
Program (New York*
William Morrow, 19 6 9 ) , pp% 237-":

^Ibid., p. 241.
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spent there by NASA, from 196I through 1965*

This amounted

to about 41 percent of NASA*s.total spending during those
years.This

is indicative of the impact of the aerospace

industry upon the U. S. economy and especially upon the
State of California.

Many authors relate that this depen

dence of whole sectors of the economy on government contracts
has more or less changed the relationship of government to
business.

This has been particularly true in the case of

the aerospace industry.^
The aerospace industry has increased its scope
because of the Vietnam War and the space program over the
last decade.

In the early Sixties the aerospace industry

was referred to as an infant industry which was expected
to become one of the industrial giants of America.

Forbes

magazine in I962 predicted that government expenditures
on space would increase from its then $11.6 billion mark

3lbid.
^ h e aerospace industry was in the process of de 
veloping the Super Sonic Transport (SST) when Congress
stopped further funding of the project. The program was to
fill the gap left in the wake of the Apollo Project as well
as being a response to the Soviet’s prototype of the SST
and the Anglo-French Concorde. With no funding in sight
for the SST program the aerospace industry has had to lay
off thousands of workers, engineers, and scientists.
This
drastic set-back culminated with NASA's slow-down, which
has contributed heavily to the temporary recession and
spiraling unemployment rates across the nation.
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to In excess of 20 billion annually by 1970.

Although the

growth level has not been that spectacular» the Industry has
still shown Impressive g a i n s .

Gerson Chanowltz, chief

economist for the Aerospace Industries Association, wrote
in Aviation W e e k , July 8, 1968t

"The aerospace Industry

Is the largest manufacturing employer In the U. S., with
well over 1.4 million people.

One In 50 people employed

In the nation works for the aerospace Industry."
NASA's growth and development has not been as
s p e c t a c u l a r as that of the aerospace Industry.

NASA

provides only about 30 percent of the business and Income
that has gone to the thriving aerospace Industries.

The

other major client Is the Department of Defense (DOD) ,
NASA's functional and allocatlonal rival In space.
The aerospace Industry devotes two-thirds of Its
effort to the military sector and the remaining one-third
to NASA.

Consequently, NASA has continued to operate below

the level of the military In space.

The relationship

between the aerospace Industry and the military has been
closely unified.

After Kennedy was elected to the presidency,

the Industrial contractors and the Air Force lobbied together
for a.larger portion of the national effort In space.

Trade

Journals were heavily laden with articles favoring the Air
Force's position on space policy.

Thus, both the Army and

the Air Force were being supported by nongovernmental

6l
service organizations and interested trade journals.
Because NASA was able to withstand this Air Force-industrial
challenge, the space agency demonstrated that it could
carry out a program as ambitious as the Apollo Project.
Adversely, it revealed to both the Elsenhower and Kennedy
administrations, as well as to following administrations,
that NASA was not able to win significant support from its
industrial constituency.

This later proved to be suffi

cient reason for diminishing NASA's budget even further.
For example, during Nixon's term as president in 1 9 6 8 ,
NASA suffered a large budget cutback of approximately
#1 billion.

The aerospace industry's response to this

sharp cutback was one of ambivalence.

Military spending

at this time had filled the gap in the aerospace work, and
civilian aircraft manufacturing continued to rise to an
all time high.
Therefore, NASA depended heavily upon the aero
space industry, as a supplier and a beneficiary, for
support, but did not receive that support to sustain
growth.

As a result, NASA's autonomy will remain in

constant jeopardy unless some strong external support
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Is found.5

NASA, then, lost a great deal of support from

its defense-oriented aerospace suppliers.

For this reason,

the space agency has undertaken many programs that have
had direct military benefits.

Hopefully, w ith more defense

spin-offs, NASA's appropriations will increase in order
for it to offer more contracts to the aerospace industry.
"The problem, however, is that NASA remains threatened
of being absorbed by its competitor, the DOD.**^
One major reason why NASA has lost vital support
from the aerospace industry, as compared to aerospacedefense relationships, is that the civilian agency was not
able to produce the space "spin-offs" that it had promised.
With the exception of teflon frying pans, n e w bathtub
calking compound, as well as other areas in medicine and
communications, there were few spin-offs of an industrial
nature.

Willard F. Rockwell of North American Rockwell

^This may develop only if some external factor
emerges in the organization's environment, e.g., increased
Soviet activity in space which threatens to supercede
the U. S. This may not be forthcoming in the near future
after the major upset of the Russians losing three
Cosmonauts in a recent flight. The Cosmonauts were sent
into space on June 6, 1971, in Soyuz 11 and rendezvoused
with their space station (Salyute) which had already been
in orbit. They were found dead immediately after their
capsule landed.
^The Civilian Defense Agency offers a good example
of a bureau that was absorbed by its competitor, the
Department of Defense.
See Downs, Inside Bureaucracy,

p . 10.
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stated that, "If you want to make money out of any Item on
the commercial market, you have to spend weeks and months
trying to figure out how you're going to get the cost down
and then a profit.

. . a lot of space stuff is too compli

cated for civilian use."^

Therefore, the space program was

not able to materialize on its promises of large amounts
of technological transfer to the American public.

Because

of this minimal amount of technology transfer, NASA has
begun to deemphasize economic "spin-offs" while at the
same time maximizing the increasing benefits accruing from
the space program for the military.

NASA, then, has been

forced into turning to the military for backing and support.
Another reason NASA has been operating below the
DOD in space is because of the civilian space agency's
patent policies.

Probably the most debated provision in

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act of
1958 has been the one relating to patent policies.

"NASA

requires that all inventions developed with governmental
funds are to be patented by the governmental agency in charge
of the program."®

Defending the principle, NASA states

that if the use of public funds leads to an invention, the
public should get the benefit without having to give a

^Cited in Kennan and Harvey, Mission to the M o o n , p. 248.
p
The Atomic Energy Commission has a policy very
similar to NASA's concerning patentable inventions.
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special reward to the private contractor.

This policy

was prevalent from 1958 up through the early Sixties, but
has been changed to allow waivers on some patentable
Inventions for private use as long as the contractor assures
the government free access to them.

Nevertheless, the

Issue of patents Is still debated between NASA and Its
contractors, especially the aerospace Industry.

"Many times

when firms do accept a NASA contract they will not assign
their best personnel to work under them If they are denied
patent r i g h t s . T h e

result has been that many firms seek

contracts elsewhere, e.g., the DOD, which has a long estab
lished policy on liberal patent decisions.
Much of the space Industry,and particularly the
aerospace Industry, would rather accept defense-oriented
space contracts because of the liberal patent policies
and because DOD contracts often lead to longer production
runs of the same Item allowing for a higher profit margin.
Memy students of the space program question why
some defense-oriented aerospace contractors are still
anxious to accept contracts with NASA.
One reason may be that companies such as North
American Rockwell, McDonnell, and Boeing are manufacturing
billions of dollars worth of defense materials annually.

9por further Information see Vernon V a n Dyke, Pride
and Power, the Rationale of the Space Program (Urbana, 1 1 1 . *
University of Illinois Press, 196^), pp. 219-220.
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with such heavy orders for war time equipment they must not
overlook the pleasant public image offered b y "peaceful**
contracts with NASA such as the Apollo Project.

These com

panies do not advertise their work in radar, laser, and n u 
clear systems.

Nor do they advertise their other hardware

such as bombers, fighters and submarines.

They do, however,

advertise in the popular media such things as a two page
full color ad dramatizing their efforts in putting a man
on the moon.
A second reason that aerospace companies seek NASA
contracts is because NASA generally utilizes only special
ized units in its programs.

This reduces the competitive

ness among firms because many of the companies have technical
capabilities in select areas.

In the Department of Defense,

contracts are highly competitive and firms often must take
a low profit margin in order to gain a con t r a c t .
A third reason companies seek NASA contracts is b e 
cause there are no penalties for failures.

A good example

of this was the Apollo 204 fire which killed Grissom, White,
and Chaffee.

Although North American Aviation was repri

manded, e.g., some projects were canceled, the government
absorbed most of the cost.
Still another explanation might be that NASA acts as
a large Works Public Administration project.
programs need thousands of p e o p l e .

Its space

Many persons who were

employed in the aerospace industry during World War II and
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the Korean War, found work with NASA.

Thus, NASA, until

recently, has been able to keep aerospace-defense employ
ment at a high lev e l .
Therefore, the aerospace industry is still closely
related to NASA's future, but this relationship has been
declining.

Without the space industry's full support, NASA

will continue to be in jeopardy.

As a result, NASA has been

constantly moving into a trend of more gradual development.
Anthony Downs describes this phenomenon as the
"deceleration cycle of bureaus."^®

In this cycle, a

bureau may change from a period of rapid growth to a period
of static development, which Downs refers to as conserver
"dominance."

A bureau shifting into this phase of the

growth cycle generally reduces its ability to innovate and
expand its functions.

This can be cited in NASA's recent

attempts to deemphasize economic "spin-offs" while point
ing out the military benefits of the civilian space program.
"Also, the fact that Congress and President Nixon have cut
sharply into NASA's budget over the last several years accounts
for the organization's desire to defend the present program
as much as possible and deemphasize many of the projected

^®For further information see Anthony Downs, Inside
Bureaucracy, pp. 13-14.
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space p r o g r a m s F u r t h e r m o r e ,

Downs believes that once a

bureau begins to decelerate or experiences an abnormal slow
down over a long period of time, it sets in motion forces
that make It decelerate more rapidly.
With NASA's budget cut heavily It must push more for
"cost effectiveness" and narrower profit margins for the
aerospace Industry.

With such Increased control over Indus

try, firms will make greater efforts to evade such regulations
or controls by seeking contracts with DOD, which has been
the pattern over the past few y e a r s .
With a bare bones budget, NASA cannot achieve the
space spectaculars that It once achieved In the Sixties*

No

longer will the clvlllsm space agency be able to utilize Im
pressive feats to maintain support from Congress and the
public •

Now that NASA has placed a man on the moon It has

only minimal support for further exploration of outer space*
As a result, NASA's development has continued to lessen over

A new project called "Pegasus" has not been openly
approved by N A S A . Peg a s u s , a bell shaped rocket transport
11^ feet high, Is to Involve a reusable booster concept
capable of delivering Saturn 5 payloads*
Its projected use
will Involve resupplying space stations while in orbit, and
possibly transport materials to the moon vehicles to build
a base there. It Is also projected to be used as a troop
transport If modified.
See Erland A. Kennan and Edmund
Harvey, Mission to the M o o n , pp. 251-2.
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the decade.

Having lost much of its public support and

support from Congress, the space agency's budget has drop
ped to a low level and canceled projects and layoffs are
more frequent.

No longer will NASA be the prototype of

the large scale government management projects because, now
that the moon landing has been achieved, new emphasis will
be upon the environment, e.g., air pollution.

These recent

governmental concerns will be approached with the same gusto
as NASA met "space.**
Therefore, a failure of NASA to maintain its budget
and long range space projects, the failure of its economic
spin-offs to materialize for industry, and the impending
threat of conversion to the military has meant that NASA
has fallen short of its main objective as a functioning
bureau.

That is to say, NASA's security and autonomy are

severely threatened and only with future support from exo
genous sources in its environment, e.g., the aerospace
industry, will NASA remain a viable civilian space agency
in the future.

Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONI

DECLINING REIGN OF THE CIVILIAN
SPACE AGENCY

As one of the most unique United States governmental
agencies, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) has provided students of bureaucracies with manyinteresting questions concerning the growth dsmamics of
bureaus.

It has been the purpose of this study to elaborate

upon several of these questions— namely, W h y was NASA able
to achieve unusual rapid expansion as a young bureau ; and
why, after this period of rapid acceleration, did NASA begin
to decline?

In providing some provisional answers to these

questions the author has developed a major hypothesis drawn
from a theoretical formulation by Anthony Downs.

The hy

pothesis states that changes in policy, function, and internal
structure are a consequence of environmental forces.

The

author has sought to provide a documented case for the
proposition that NASA's rapid growth and subsequent decline
during the last decade was a function of laarge scale changes
in external factors.
This documentation has been accomplished by analyz
ing the impact of certain external variables considered
by the author to have been the most important factors affect
ing NASA's growth pattern.

These are:
69

international prestige,
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presidential Ideology, and other organizations, e.g., the
aerospace Industry and the Defense Department.

Each vari

able has been analyzed In terms of propositions regarding
that variable's Impact upon NASA's growth.

Findings associ

ated with these propositions have been well documented
throughout the text.
Reviewing the relationship between the first two
variables. I.e., International prestige and presidential
Ideology, Chapter 2 demonstrates that both external factors
have caused many changes to occur In NASA's growth pattern.
For example, during Kennedy's Administration, the space pro
gram shifted Its major policy advocating a purely scientific
program to one promoting technological capability and engin
eering "spectaculars" In order to Increase national Interest
and International prestige for the United States.

This was

almost a direct reversal of the policies established by the
more conservative Elsenhower Administration.

In addition,

the study has shown that because NASA was able to achieve
Impressive space shots and gain International prestige. Its
status became higher vls-a—vis other bureaus and it was
able to obtain unusual Increments In appropriations from
Congress.

Such a shift In policy then— I.e., the switch

from a science program to one emphasizing engineering--pro
duced more support for the program and thus allowed It to
expand even more readily-

This study, thus, has supported

the four propositions listed In Chapter 2%

(1) The more
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the programs of a bureau contribute to national prestige,
the higher its status vis-a-vis other b u r e a u s ; (2) the higher
the status of a bureau, the less it must compete for funds
with other bureaus;

(3) the less a bureau must compete for

funds, the faster it grows; and (4) perceptions of the presi
dential role may alter the speed with which a bureau grows,
i.e., the more conservative the president, the greater the
restraint on growth.
Concerning the third variable, i.e., other organiza
tions, this study has found that the role of the Defense
Department (DOD) has been very important in determining NASA's
development.

For example, as the author has discussed in

Chapter 3, the DOD has been a constant threat to NASA b e 
cause it is both a functional and allocational rival of the
civilian space agency.

This was especially evident during

NASA's early years of development because the Army, Navy,
and the Air Force wished to take over the space agency's func
tions of space exploration, but for military purposes.

How

ever, the fact that all three segments of the DOD were
interested in NASA meant that much interdepartmental rivalry
occurred.

This was naturally an advantage to NASA as a

young bureau because its officials did not have to face a
tu^ified threat, but a divided one.

This situation more or

less confirms the proposition that the greater the number of
competitors that seek to absorb the central goals of another
agency, the lower the probability that the agency will be
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destroyed.
Chapter 3 also discusses the recent challenge of
the DOD, primarily the Air Force division.

Because of the

increased lack of support from Congress and the President,
the aerospace industry, and the American public, NASA has
become weaker and thus even more fearful of annihilation
or absorption by the DOD.^

This situation has led NASA

officials to stress the importance of its program to Congress
men as well as the American public.

Pressure tactics such

as reference to increased Soviet activity in space have
been used.

The additional efforts of NASA to stress mili

tary benefits accruing from the space program have also
been evident.

Even the increased emphasis on science has

been apparent in the media concerning the Apollo 15 mission
to the moon.

These facts sustain the other propositions also

formulated in Chapter 3.

The first states that during peri

ods of growth, agencies resort to imperialism or logrolling
in order to survive.

The second states that in periods of

decline, the more an agency logrolls, the better its cap
acity to defend its core interests against the imperialism
of former rivals•
In Chapter 4 the author has shown the relationship
between the aerospace industry and NASA.

As discussed in

that chapter, the aerospace industry deals mainly in

^Por reasons regarding NASA's lack of support see
Chapter 2•
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contracts with the Defense Department and NASA.

Because

the aerospace industry has become increasingly disenchanted
with NASA, it has developed even closer ties with its much
O
larger customer, the Department of Defense (DOD).
This
situation is very similar to the one w h ich occurred at the
outset of NASA's development.

At that time, the aerospace

industry developed close relationships w ith the Army, Navy,
and Air Force in their various roles in the space program.
When NASA finally became established, the space industry
eventually became more dependent upon the space agency,
although always maintaining their primary relationship with
the DOD.

Now, the space industry, dur to the slowdown and

other factors, is seeking less contracts w ith NASA and is
becoming even more dependent on the DOD.

A s a result of the

aerospace industry's weakening support for NASA, the space
agency has become even more fearful of the military.
has had an enormous effect on the space agency.

This

NASA has

responded to this situation by shifting major goals in the
organization.

For example, a major shift In policy can be

seen in the deemphasis of space spectaculars and industrial
"spin-offs,** e.g., teflon frying pans, to one stressing
scientific and military benefits of the space program.

The

move to increase the scientific aspect of the space program
has been evident in the planning of the Apollo 15 mission.

2
For more information concerning w h y the aerospace
industry became disenchanted with NASA, see Chapter 4.
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By such a shift in policy, NASA hopes to regain full
support from Congress and the American public*

With this

support, the space agency will be able to again expand
and offer additional industrial contracts, thus hopefully
regaining more support from the aerospace industries*
Therefore, in reviewing the relationship between the
aerospace industry, the Defense Department, and NASA, this
study has found that, first, the greater the number of
competitors seeking to absorb an agency, the lower the
probability that the suppliers and beneficiaries of that
agency will support it.

And second, the stronger a

bureau's competitors, the less likely the bureau's suppliers
and beneficiaries will support that bureau*
This study, then, has provided a detailed analysis
of NASA's overall growth and decline since its creation in
1958.

Reasons behind the causes of NASA's undulating

growth pattern have been examined and found to be related
to external forces in the space agency's environment*
That is to say that changes in policy, function, and
internal structure of NASA have been a consequence of
environmental forces.

Therefore, we can conclude from

this study that NASA's rapid growth and subsequent decline
during the last decade was a function of large scale
changes in external factors.
Realizing the impact of environmental forces upon
NASA's growth and development, this author can perhaps

75
make some projections as to what will happen to NASA in
the future.

Although highly speculative, some major

changes will need to be forthcoming if NASA is going to
survive its present slowdown.

Already NASA officials are

taking steps to recover the space agency's fallen image
among Americans.

Increased media coverage of all space

shots with special emphasis on their scientific achieve
ments is now being undertaken.3

Hopefully, according to

NASA officials, this scientific base behind the space
shots will provide Americans with a more concrete reason
to support the expensive space program.

This increased

emphasis on the scientific aspect of the space program
should help NASA regain vital support from Congress and
the American public.
Such a revitalization of the space program should
also be enhanced by the increased Soviet activity in
space.

For example, several months ago the Soviets

launched Mars-2, which was described by the official Soviet
news agency T a s s , as being an automatic interplanetary
station.

Although it was not determined b y U. S. authori

ties whether Mars-2 would attempt a soft landing on Mars,
it is known that the vehicle is scheduled to reach the

3rhe Apollo 15 moon flight is set for July 26, 1971
and is expected to determine whether all the moon craters
were created by meteor impact, or whether some are volcanic
David R. Scott, Commander of the flight, has stated that
"Apollo 15 will be the most singular scientific expedition
ever conducted."
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planet by November.
Other Soviet activity includes the permanent manned
orbital space station, Salyute.

The Russians, however,

suffered a major setback in this program when a tiny hole
in the wall off Soyuz 11, the spaceship which had docked
temporarily with Salyute, caused the deaths of three
Soviet Cosmonauts on July 3» 1971-

This tragedy will

probably have the effect of making future U. S. space shots
more interesting because Americans again have become aware
of the dangers in manned space flight.

Such interest will

nonetheless eventually wear off unless the Soviets resume
their increased role in space.

If this trend should

continue, the United States governmental officials may
again turn to NASA to meet the Russian challenge in s p a c e .
As it now stands. Project Skylab will follow
Apollo.

Skylab is a three-man earth orbiting laboratory

that is more advanced than the present Soviet Salyute
station.

Future plans include three different three-man

crews, flying modified Apollo command ships, to visit this
laboratory for periods up to fifty-six days in 1973.
They will be conducting scientific, engineering, and medical
experiments.
Following S k y l a b , projections are for a reusable
space shuttle called Pegasus, which will fly like an
airliner on repeated trips to and from

space.

But this
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program's future Is very uncertain.

Congress has been

increasingly conservative with funds for manned space
flight— and the earliest NASA can now hope to have an
operational shuttle program is 1978 or 1979Therefore, NASA's future rests with the amount of
funding it will be able to receive from Congress.

Such

funding, as in the past, will depend heavily upon large
scale changes in external forces, e.g., increased Soviet
challenge in space.

Congress'

support will also depend

upon the aerospace industry's willingness to sustain
their backing for NASA, as well as the mood of the American
public toward future expensive space p r o j e c t s .

If NASA

is not able to receive support from these sectors in the
next five years, the author feels that the civilian space
agency will eventually be absorbed by its larger competitor
— the Department of Defense.

NASA's fear of being absorbed

by the military is certainly Justified because the Defense
Department has desired a larger share of the space program
since the civilian agency's creation.

This thesis has examined the major causes behind
NASA's rapid growth and subsequent decline since its
creation in 1958.

From the analysis I have concluded that

changes in policy, function, and the internal structure
of the space agency are a consequence of changes in
external variables--namely, international prestige,
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presidential ideology, and other organizations, e . g . , the
aerospace industry and the Defense D e p a r t m e n t .

I have

also made several projections as to what may happen to
NASA in the future on the basis of what I have learned
from material gathered for the study.
This thesis, however, provides only a starting
point for the myriad of subjects relating to the growth
dynamics of NASA.

Other studies might include a review

of basic theoretical propositions outlined b y Anthony
Downs in his book Inside Bureaucracy, but modified to
relate to the space agencyare I

Examples of these propositions

(1) As NASA grew larger, the average level of talent

therein initially rose, and then declined;
growth of NASA's social functions led

(2) the rapid

to a cumulative

change in the character of its personnel which
accelerate its rate of growth still further;

tended to

(3) decline

or relative stagnation of NASA's social functions has led
to a cumulative change in the character of its personnel
which has tended to decelerate its growth still further.
Such theoretical propositions
by other students of bureaucracies in

as these

may be studied

order to gain a

better understanding of not only the growth dynamics of
NASA, but of other similar bureaus as w e l l .
Therefore, NASA has provided an interesting study
of the internal growth dynamics of a governmental bureau.
Its future as a civilian space agency still remains
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tmcertaln, and thus It will continue to be of* interest to
political scientists and public administrators for some time
to c o m e .

As it now stands, without further external d e 

velopments, such as a new Soviet challenge in space, the
space agency will not obtain the support needed to keep it
alive.

If this should result, and NASA becomes an

appendage to the Defense Department, its future as a
civilian space agency will be b l e a k , and eventually it
will surely die an untimely death.
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APPENDIX
SELECTED CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR SPACE EVENTS
1957'
Oct. 4

Sputnik I, USSR, first earth satellite.

Nov. 3

Sputnik II, USSR satellite; carried first
live dog— Laika.

19581
Jan. 31

Explorer I, U.S. satellite ; discovered Van
Allen Belt.

Mar. 17

Vanguard I, U.S. satellite ; solar powered
transmitters•

May 15

Sputnik III, USSR satellite ; orbiting geo
physical laboratory.

Oct. 1

United States establishes National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA).

1959
Sept. 12

Luna II, USSR moon probe; first probe to
impact moon.

Oct. 4

Luna III, USSR moon probe ; took first photo
graphs of the far side of moon.

1960
Apr* 1

TIROS I, U.S. satellite ; first of series of
successful meteorological satellites.
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Aug. 12

Echo 1, U.S. satellite; a 100 foot di 
ameter balloon in orbit, producing first
passive communication satellite.

1961
Apr. 12

Vostok I, USSR satellite; contained Yuri
Gagarin, first man to orbit the earth.

May 5

Mercury "Freedom 7»” U.S., suborbital
flight of Alan 3. Shepard, Jr-

July 21

Mercury "Liberty Bell 7»" U.S., subor
bital flight of Virgil I. Grissom.

Aug. 6-7

Vostok II, USSR satellite; contained
Gherman S. Titov; completed 77 orbits.

1962
Feb. 20

Mercury "Friendship 7»" U.S. satellite;
John H. Glenn, Jr., first U.S. man to
orbit the earth.

July 10

Telestar I, U.S. satellite ; first com
mercially financed communications satel
lite .

Aug. 11-15

Vostok III, USSR satellite; Andrian G.
Nikolayev; Vostoks III and IV approached
within 3 miles of each other.

Aug. 12-15

Vostok IV, USSR satellite;
Pooovich.

Pavel R.
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Oct. 3

Mercury ”Sigma 7," U.S. satellite; Walter
Schirra, Jr.; first splashdown in detailed
re-entry z o n e .

Dec. 1^

Mariner 2, U.S. Venus prohe; passed within
22,000 miles of Venus.
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May 15-16

Mercury "Faith 7," U.S. satellite; L.
Gordon Cooper, Jr.; 22 orhits— longest
Mercury flight.

June 14-19

Vostok V, USSR satellite ; Valery F. B y 
kovsky; 81 orbits.

June 16-19

Vostok VI, USSR satellite; Valentina V.
Tereshkova, first woman in space.

'64
July 28

Ranger 7, U.S. moon probe; photographed
face of moon before impact.

Oct. 12

Voskhod I, USSR satellite; first 3-man
spacecraft ; Vladimir M. Komarov, K o n 
stantin P. Feoktistov, Boris B. Yegorov.

'65
Mar- 18

Voskhod 2, USSR satellite; Pavel I. B e l 
yayev and Alexei A. Leonov;

first "walk

in space."
Mar. 23

Gemini 3, U.S. satellite; Virgil I. Grissom
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and John W. Young; first test of a Gemini
spacecraft.
Apr. 23

Molniya lA, USSR satellite;

first USSR

communications satellite.
June 3-7

Gemini 4, U.S. satellite ; James A- McDivitt and Edward H. White II; White per
formed first U.S. "walk in space."

July l4

Mariner 4, U.S. Mars probe; launched
Nov. 28, 1964; passed within 6,200 miles
of M a r s .

Aug. 21-29

Gemini 5» U.S.

satellite; Leroy G . Cooper

and Charles Conrad, Jr.; completed 120
orbits.
D e c . 4-18

Gemini 7, U.S. satellite ; Frank Borman
and James A. Lovell, Jr.; 220 orbits.

D e c . 15-16

Gemini 6, U.S. satellite; Walter M.
Schirra, Jr., and Thomas P. Stafford;
first rendezvous in space.

1966
Jan. 31

Luna IX, USSR lunar probe;

first soft

landing on moon; transmitted photographs
of surface.
Mar. 16-17

Gemini 8 , U.S. satellite; Neil A. A r m 
strong and David R. Scott ; first docking
in space with previously launched target
v ehicle.
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Mar. 31

Lima X, USSR limar probe; first probe
to achieve lunar o r b i t .

May 30

Surveyor 1, U.S. lunar probe ; first U.S.
probe to soft land on the moon.

July 18-21

Gemini 10, U.S. satellite; John W. Young
and Michael Collins; rendezvoused w ith
Gemini 8 target vehicle; first retrieval
of a space object (a test package on
target vehicle).

1967
Jan. 27

Apollo AS-204, U.S. lunar spacecraft,
Roger B. Chaffee, Virgil I. Grissom, and
Edward H. White II, killed in flash fire
in the spacecraft test center at Cape
C anaveral.

Apr- 23

Soyuz I, USSR satellite ; Vladimir Komarov
killed on April 24 in recovery phase.

Oct. 18

Venera IV, USSR Venus probe; launched
June 12; ejected an 884 pound capsule
to the surface; returned data on the planet's
atmosphere.

Oct. 19

Mariner 5» U.S. Venus probe ; launched June
14; passed within 2_$,000 miles of Venus.

Oct. 26-30

Cosmos 1 8 6 , 188, USSR satellites ; first
automatic rendezvous and docking.
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Nov* 9

Apollo 4, U.S. satellite;

first flight

of Saturn V launch vehicle.
1968
Apr. 22

Space rescue treaty signed by 43 nations,
including the U.S., U . K . , and USSR;
provided for international cooperation
in emergency assistance to space travel
ers .

Sept. 15

Zond V, USSR moon probe; first unmanned
round trip flight to the moon.

Oct. 11-22

Apollo 7i U.S.; Walter M. Schirra, Jr.,
Donn F. Eisele, R. Walter Cunningham;
first manned test of Apollo command module ;
first live TV transmissions from orbit.

Oct. 26-30

Soyuz I I I , USSR, George T. Beregovoi;
first manned rendezvous and possible
docking b y a Soviet cosmonaut.

Dec. 21-27

Apollo 8, U.S.; Frank Borman, James A.
Lovell, Jr., William A. Anders; first
spacecraft in circumlunar orbit.

1969
Jan. 14-17

Soyuz IV, USSR, Vladamir A. Shatalov;
rendezvoused and docked w ith So3ruz V.

Jan. 15-18

Soyuz V, USSR; Boris V. Volynov, Aleksei
S. Yeliseyev, Yevgeny V. Khrunov;
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rendezvoused and docked with Soyuz IV.

Mar. 3-13

Apollo 9» U.S.; James A. M c D i w i t t ,
David R. Scott, Russell L. Schwelkart;
first descent to within 9 miles of the
moon *s s u r f a c e .
Apollo 11, U.S.; Nell A- A r m s t r o n g , Edwin
E. Aldrln, Jr.; Michael Collins;

first

manned landing on the moon.
O o t . 11—16

Soyuz VI, USSR; Geogly Shonln, Valrly
Kabasov; one of three spacecraft and
seven men put Into earth orbit simultane
ously for first time.

Oct. 12-17

S o y u z V C I , USSR; Anatoley Fllipchenko,
Viktor Gorbakov, Vladislav Volkov; part
of Soyuz series VI, VII, VIII-

Oct. 13-18

Soyuz VIII, USSR; Vladimir Shatalov,
Aleksey Yeliseyev; part of Soyuz series
VI, VII, VIII.

Nov. 14-24

Apollo 12, U.S.; Charles Conrad, Jr.,
Richard F. Gordon, J r . , A l a n Bean;

second

manned lunar landing mission; Investi
gated Surveyor 3 spacecraft.
1970

Apr. 11-17

Apollo 1 3 , U.S.; James

A. Lovell, Jr.,

Fred W. Raise, Jr., John L. Swlgert, Jr.;
third manned lunar landing, but attempt
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was aborted due to malfunctions while
the astronauts were on their way to the
moon.

June 1-17

Soyuz IX, USSR; Andreiyan Nikolayez,
Vitaly SevastianoTT; designed to test man's
ability to withstand long periods of
weightlessness;

28? o r b i t s .

1971
Jan. 31Feb. 5

Apollo 14, U.S.; Alan B . Shepard, Edgar
Mitchell, Stuart Roosen, Jr.; performed
seismographic tests on the moon.

Apr- 23

Salyute I, USSR ; permanent orbital labor
atory-

Apr. 20

Soyuz X, USSR; Vladamir A- Shatalov,
Aleksei S. Yeliseyev, Nikolai Rukavishrikov; rendezvoused and docked with
Salyute.

June 9July 3

Soyuz XI, USSR; Georgy Dobrovolsky,
Vladislav Volkov, Viktor Patsayev; killed
during reentry p h a s e .

July 26Aug. 7

Apollo 15» U.S.; David R. Scott, Alfred
H. Worden, James 3. Irvin;

lunar landing

mission; exploration of moon's terrain.

